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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











CITY OF YORK; MICHAEL S. HOSE;  
RICHARD S. PEDDICORD; JEFFREY T. SPENCE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00121) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Donte Milburn appeals the District Court’s order granting the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the Magistrate Judge’s orders denying his 
requests to amend his complaint.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
In August 2006, a man named Juan Laboy was shot and killed in York, 
Pennsylvania.  Two years later, a grand jury was convened to determine whether Milburn 
should be charged with the shooting.  In the grand-jury proceedings, the prosecuting 
attorney, William Graff, presented several witnesses, including Luis Valentine and 
Gregory Hall.  Both Valentine and Hall testified that Milburn had admitted to them that 
he and an accomplice had shot Laboy after he had resisted their attempt to rob him.  The 
grand jury recommended that Milburn be prosecuted.  On October 29, 2008, Milburn, 
who was already incarcerated for a different conviction, was arrested and charged with 
criminal homicide, robbery, and two counts of criminal conspiracy.  He was arraigned on 
January 26, 2009.   
 At Milburn’s criminal trial, Valentine admitted that he had lied to the grand jury 
about Milburn’s involvement.  Hall did not testify, for reasons that are not clear.  The 
prosecution dropped all charges against Milburn on the second day of trial.   
 On January 6, 2012, Milburn filed this lawsuit, naming as defendants the City of 
York and several City police officers.  Milburn claimed, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the 
defendants had engaged in malicious prosecution and abuse of process; he also raised a 
municipal-liability claim.  In September 2012, Milburn filed a motion to amend the 
complaint, seeking to add the prosecuting attorney, Graff, as a defendant.  The Magistrate 
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Judge denied that request.  Milburn later filed another motion to amend his complaint, 
this time seeking to add a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and a 
claim of false arrest.  The Magistrate Judge again refused to allow amendment.  The 
District Court then granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Milburn filed a 
timely notice of appeal to this Court.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the orders denying 
Milburn leave to amend his complaint for abuse of discretion, Garvin v. City of Phila., 
354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003),1 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
summary-judgment order, see Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  First, the Magistrate 
Judge did not err in concluding that it would have been futile for Milburn to amend his 
complaint to name Graff as a party.  In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for claims 
under § 1983 is two years.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Milburn’s malicious-prosecution claim accrued on January 12, 2010, when the criminal 
action was terminated, see Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348 (3d Cir. 1989), and he was 
thus required to file his § 1983 claims on or before January 12, 2012.  His initial 
                                                                
1 As we note above, the Magistrate Judge entered the orders denying Milburn’s motions 
to amend.  Milburn failed to file an appeal with the District Court of the Magistrate 
Judge’s order denying his first motion to amend.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  While 
Milburn did file an appeal of the second order, it appears that the District Court never 
ruled on that request.  By failing to appeal the first order to the District Court, Milburn 
waived his right to appeal that ruling to this Court.  See United States v. Polishan, 336 
F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2003).  However, this failure to appeal does not deprive this Court 
of jurisdiction, see id. at 239, and because the defendants have not raised this waiver 
argument, we will address Milburn’s arguments on the merits, see generally Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2013) (“a party can waive a 
waiver argument by not making the argument . . . in its briefs”).    
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complaint was timely; however, he sought to amend his complaint to add Graff on 
September 12, 2012, well outside the two-year limitations period.   
 Accordingly, Milburn’s claim against Graff would be timely only if it related back 
to the date of the original complaint.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).  As relevant here, this 
required a showing that, within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint, the party 
to be added to the action “received such notice of the action.”  Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i).  As 
the Magistrate Judge concluded, the record is bereft of any facts suggesting that Graff 
had actual or imputed notice of the lawsuit during the pertinent period.  See Singletary v. 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2001).  While Milburn claims that the 
same law firm that represented the named defendants would likely have represented 
Graff, this will not suffice here, where Milburn has presented no evidence whatsoever 
suggesting that the attorneys “had any communication or relationship whatsoever with 
[Graff] within the 120-day period.”  Garvin, 354 F.3d at 226.  Thus, as the Magistrate 
Judge held, it would have been futile to amend the complaint to raise this time-barred 
claim.  See id. at 222.2 
We likewise agree with the Magistrate Judge’s refusal to permit Milburn to amend 
his complaint to bring a claim of false arrest and a claim alleging a Brady violation.  As 
to the former, the false-arrest claim accrued on January 26, 2009, when Milburn was 
arraigned.  See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007).  The limitations period for 
this claim therefore expired on January 26, 2011 — that is, before Milburn filed his initial 
                                                                
2 Graff would also have enjoyed absolute immunity from claims concerning his actions 
“in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.”  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 
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complaint.  Accordingly, this amendment would have been futile even assuming that it 
related back under Rule 15(c).  See, e.g., Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 573-74 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
In his putative Brady claim, Milburn alleges that the defendants violated his rights 
by failing to test blood samples and gunshot residue that were found on the crime scene; 
he contends that this evidence could have established his innocence.  Even assuming that 
this claim would not have been time-barred, it would have been futile for Milburn to raise 
it.  The blood samples and gunshot residue represent “potentially useful evidence,” 
because Milburn can only “hope that, had the evidence been preserved, a . . . test 
conducted on the substance[s] would have exonerated him.”  Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 
544, 548 (2004) (quotation marks omitted).  To make out a due-process claim with 
respect to potentially useful evidence, Milburn must show that the Government acted in 
“bad faith” when it destroyed the evidence.  Id.; see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 
U.S. 51, 57 (1988).  Here, Milburn’s allegations of bad faith are entirely conclusory and 
fail to state a facially plausible claim.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.”).  The Magistrate Judge therefore did not err in denying leave 
to present this claim.  See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 243 
(3d Cir. 2010) (amendment is futile if the amended complaint fails to state a claim). 
We also agree with the District Court’s determination that the defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment on Milburn’s malicious-prosecution claim.  To establish 
this claim, Milburn was required to show, among other things, that the criminal 
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proceeding “was initiated without probable cause.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 
497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).  In cases like this one, where the grand jury issued a 
presentment, that presentment “constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to 
prosecute”; this presumption can be overcome only “by evidence that the presentment 
was procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.”  Rose, 871 F.2d at 353.   
Here, the grand jury issued its presentment after hearing both Valentine and Hall 
identify Milburn as the perpetrator.  While Milburn alleges that the defendants induced 
Valentine and Hall to testify falsely, he presents no evidence in support of his claims.  
See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 2002) (“a party will not 
be able to withstand a motion for summary judgment merely by making allegations”).  In 
fact, the record evidence is to the contrary — Valentine testified in his deposition that the 
defendants did not tell him to give a false statement.  Further, while Milburn complains 
that the defendants failed to present evidence to the grand jury that tended to implicate 
other individuals, that is insufficient to rebut the presumption created by the presentment.  
See Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that Milburn’s claim could not 
survive summary judgment.  See id.; see also Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 
F.3d 782, 790 (3d Cir. 2000).   
Nor did the District Court err in granting judgment to the defendants on Milburn’s 
abuse-of-process claim.  As we have explained, “a section 1983 claim for malicious 
abuse of process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for 
a purpose other than that intended by the law.”  Rose, 871 F.2d at 350 n.17 (internal 
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quotation marks omitted).  Here, Milburn has steadfastly maintained that the criminal 
action was improper from the start, which constitutes malicious prosecution.  See id.  He 
presented no evidence that the criminal proceedings were ever used for an improper 
purpose.  See generally Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 
305 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Finally, given that the District Court did not err in granting judgment to the 
defendants on Milburn’s various claims, it was also appropriate to grant judgment on his 
claim of municipal liability.  See Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (“in 
order for municipal liability to exist, there must still be a violation of the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights”). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
